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Dreams create new stories out of nothing.
Although dreams contain themes, con-
cerns, dream figures, objects, etc. that cor-
respond closely to waking life, these are
only story elements. The story itself weaves
these mnemonic items together in a man-
ner far more novel than a simple assem-
blage or collage, producing an experience
having a life-like timeframe and life-like
(if often bizarre and impossible) causal-
ity (Pace-Schott, 2007; Hobson, 2009). It
is as if one is immersed in another “real-
ity” entirely of one’s own non-volitional,
making (see Rechtschaffen, 1978). Given
this phenomenology, it’s not difficult to
see why some indigenous animist soci-
eties believe dreams represent a separate
world parallel with waking life (Nielsen,
1991). But neuroscience offers some other
explanations.
Recent speculations have focused on
the brain’s “default network” as a possible
neural substrate of dreaming (Pace-Schott,
2007, 2011a,b; Nir and Tononi, 2010;
Wamsley and Stickgold, 2010; Domhoff,
2011). The default network consists of
regions that, in the absence of exterocep-
tive attention or narrowly focused men-
tal effort, support self-directed concerns,
immersion in one’s inner life (e.g., day-
dreaming) or imagining the inner life of
others (Theory of Mind) (Buckner et al.,
2008; Andrews-Hanna, 2012; Buckner,
2012). Most importantly for the current
topic, the default network also simu-
lates future scenarios and re-creates past
ones drawing upon material in episodic,
autobiographical, and semantic memory
(Schacter et al., 2007; Schacter, 2012).
Here I will suggest that such constructive
activities of the brain represent a “hard-
wired” tendency to represent reality in
the form of narrative—a “story-telling”
instinct or module.
The default network was origi-
nally identified using positron emission
tomography (PET) as those regions show-
ing task-induced deactivation (Gusnard
et al., 2001; Raichle et al., 2001).
Subsequently, it was discovered that
temporal synchrony of low frequency
(0.01–0.1Hz) spontaneous fluctuations of
the blood-oxygen dependent (BOLD) sig-
nal of fMRI identifies both anatomical and
functional connectivity among regions
of the default network (Fox and Raichle,
2007; Greicius et al., 2008). This network
consists of (1) medial parietal areas: pos-
terior cingulate (pCC) and retrosplenial
(Rsp) cortices; (2) posterior-lateral areas:
inferior parietal lobule (IPL), temporo-
parietal junction (TPJ), lateral temporal
cortex (LTC), temporal poles (TP); (3)
medial temporal regions: hippocampal
formation (HF), parahippocampal cor-
tex (PHC); and (4) medial prefrontal
areas: ventromedial (vmPFC) and dor-
somedial (dmPFC) prefrontal cortices
(Buckner et al., 2008; Spreng et al., 2009;
Andrews-Hanna, 2012).
Resting state functional connectivity
analyses of BOLD oscillations in wak-
ing have identified two default-network
subsystems each of which fluctuates syn-
chronously with central nodes in the pCC
and anterior medial PFC (amPFC) but
not with each other (Buckner et al., 2008;
Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Andrews-
Hanna, 2012). The dorsomedial prefrontal
subsystem includes the dmPFC, LTC, TPJ,
and TP whereas the medial temporal lobe
subsystem includes the HF, PHC, Rsp,
IPL, and vmPFC. The dorsomedial pre-
frontal subsystem selectively activates dur-
ing experimental tasks involving reflection
on one’s own mental state and that of
others as well as other forms of social cog-
nition (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Mar,
2011; Andrews-Hanna, 2012). In contrast,
the medial temporal lobe subsystem is
selectively activated by retrieval of episodic
and autobiographical memories as well as
by imagination of future scenarios and
concerns (Schacter et al., 2007; Andrews-
Hanna et al., 2010; Andrews-Hanna, 2012;
Schacter, 2012). The central nodes acti-
vate along with most tasks that recruit one
or the other subsystem (Andrews-Hanna,
2012).
Synchrony of BOLD fluctuations
among components of the default net-
work persists into light (Drummond et al.,
2005; Horovitz et al., 2008; Larson-Prior
et al., 2009) and Stage 2 (Laufs et al.,
2007) NREM sleep. However, in slow-
wave sleep (SWS), frontal regions may
uncouple from the rest of the default net-
work (Horovitz et al., 2009; Samann et al.,
2011, but see Koike et al., 2011). In the
one study examining REM, unlike both
waking and NREM, there appeared a lack
of connectivity between the dorsomedial
prefrontal subsystem and the posterior
central node of the default network in the
pCC (Koike et al., 2011). Koike et al. spec-
ulate that this disconnection contributes
to the illogic and bizarreness of dream
cognition, as has also been suggested for
loss of antero-posterior EEG synchrony
in the fast, gamma (>30Hz) frequencies
during REM (Corsi-Cabrera et al., 2003,
2008).
Earlier PET and fMRI activational stud-
ies of sleep also showed distinctly differ-
ent activity in medial limbic versus lateral
association cortex during REM sleep. After
sleep onset during NREM, widespread
cortical and subcortical areas become less
active (Braun et al., 1997; Maquet et al.,
1997; Nofzinger et al., 2002; Kaufmann
et al., 2006). However, with the onset
of REM sleep, midline limbic regions of
the frontal cortex and subcortex reactivate
to levels equaling and sometimes exceed-
ing those of waking, whereas lateral and
posterior-medial cortical areas remain in
a NREM-like deactivated state (Maquet
et al., 1996, 2005; Braun et al., 1997,
www.frontiersin.org April 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 159 | 1
Pace-Schott Dreams as story instinct
1998; Nofzinger et al., 1997, 2004). This
unique pattern of REM activation has been
extensively mapped onto dream experi-
ences (Hobson et al., 2000; Hobson and
Pace-Schott, 2002; Hobson, 2009; Pace-
Schott, 2011a). NREM dreams may arise
from more transient activations of similar
networks (see Nielsen, 2000). Abnormally
intensified dreaming, such as nightmares
(Levin and Nielsen, 2007), or loss of
dreaming (Solms, 1997) may represent,
respectively, a failure to regulate or support
operation of this limbic network.
Therefore, based on activational stud-
ies, the anterior central node (amPFC)
and much of the mediotemporal subsys-
tem (e.g., vmPFC, HF, PHC) of the default
network may be similarly active in waking
and REM.However, the posterior key node
(pCC) and certain components of both
the dorsomedial prefrontal (TPJ, LTL)
and mediotemporal (Rsp, IPL) subsys-
tems may not become similarly active. The
one functional connectivity study of REM
also suggests this disconnection between
the pCC and dmPFC. Therefore, during
REM-sleep dreaming, simulation of life-
like scenarios may occur but be incom-
pletely constrained by autobiographical
memory (both functions of themediotem-
poral subsystem). Similarly, in comparison
to resting-state waking, self-referential and
social cognitive reasoning subserved by the
dorsomedial prefrontal system may be less
integrated with autobiographical memory.
But do dreams actually tell stories?
Cipolli and Poli (1992) applied a formal,
story grammar developed to describe nar-
rative texts (Mandler and Johnson, 1977)
to REM-dream reports collected by instru-
mental laboratory awakenings. Formal
elements of dream narratives resembled
typical stories, for example, by inclusion
of characters, settings and a hierarchical
event structure (Cipolli and Poli, 1992).
Moreover, these elements remained sta-
ble between the nocturnal report and
its retrospective morning report suggest-
ing that story-like structure was a fea-
ture of the dream experience itself rather
than being imposed upon its recall dur-
ing waking. Cippolli and Poli suggest that
higher-order cognitive processes organize
dream experience (Cipolli et al., 1998).
However, story structure may also be
the basic manner in which brain orga-
nizes experience. Although obscured by
temporal progression of events and of
cause and effect in waking, this ten-
dency may become more apparent dur-
ing the non-volitional process of dreaming
and pathological states such as delirium
or confabulation (Solms, 1997; Hobson,
1999; Schnider, 2003, 2008; Hirstein,
2005).
Like dreaming, spontaneous behavioral
confabulation involves a fictive narrative
produced effortlessly, without insight as to
its veracity, that is often acted upon by the
patient (Schnider, 2003, 2008; Hirstein,
2005; Gilboa et al., 2006; Nahum et al.,
2012). Spontaneous confabulation results
from lesions of the anterior limbic system
including posterior medial orbitofrontal
cortex (pmOPFC, part of vmPFC) and its
subcortical connections (Schnider, 2003,
2008; Hirstein, 2005; Gilboa et al., 2006).
Confabulated memories usually contain
real autobiographical events including
those from the remote past (Schnider,
2003, 2008; Hirstein, 2005). Such loss
of insight has been attributed to disrup-
tion of a reality filtering function local-
ized to the vmPFC/pmOPFC (Schnider,
2003, 2008) or to a more general deficit
in strategic retrieval and verification of
memories (Gilboa et al., 2006). In either
case, however, phenomenological similar-
ities exist with dreaming. For example,
confabulators create plausible but false
explanations for inconsistencies in their
stories (Hirstein, 2005), closely resem-
bling “ad-hoc explanations” for improb-
able dream occurrences (Williams et al.,
1992). Additionally, “pathological false
recognition” (Hirstein, 2005) in confab-
ulation parallels dreamers’ assigning an
identity to dream characters perceptu-
ally dissimilar to their waking counterpart
(Kahn et al., 2000).
Therefore, in both confabulation and
dreaming, altered functioning of the pre-
frontal cortex may release from reality-
filtering or executive constraint an innate
human tendency to create stories that
organize past, present, and future reality.
Dreaming may represent a potent, nat-
urally occurring form of confabulation
in which imaginary events are not only
created and believed but are vividly expe-
rienced as organized, multimodal halluci-
nations (Hobson, 1999; Pace-Schott, 2007,
2011a). Of course, hallucinosis differenti-
ates dreaming and confabulation as does
the fact that vmPFC/pmOPFC damage
leads to confabulation whereas its activa-
tion accompanies dreaming. Nonetheless,
in both phenomena, involuntary gener-
ation of an organized, fictive narrative
entirely lacking insight suggests that they
may share neural mechanisms. Possibly,
the loss of pre-frontally mediated real-
ity monitoring, due either to pmOPFC
damage in confabulation or lateral frontal
inactivity during dreaming, may release
narrative-production mechanisms from
inhibitory restraint.
But what about normal narrative
production? Braun et al. (2001) per-
formed PET conjunction analysis to
identify modality-independent regions
activated by storytelling in both English
and American Sign Language. Although
activity was shared in widespread medial
and lateral cortical areas, medial prefrontal
activation could be most directly related
to the generic production of narrative dis-
course apart from the imagery, lexical,
and memory processes shared by the two
modes of storytelling (Braun et al., 2001).
Therefore, portions of this same network
may be engaged in volitional storytelling
(see Mar, 2004 for review).
However, this putative storytelling
module expressed as dreaming or confab-
ulation rarely yields levels of organization
equal to volitional narrative. For example,
discontinuities in dream plots are suffi-
ciently common that judges are unable
to distinguish artificial reports created
by splicing together text from different
dreamers’ reports from intact dreams
(Stickgold et al., 1994). Nonetheless, the
brain may attempt to impose wake-like
temporal causality on any experience, real,
or imagined. Dream hallucinosis itself may
generate low-level narrative coherence
by associative processes in which images
evoke related images (see Rittenhouse
et al., 1994) that are successively woven
together by this putative tendency to orga-
nize experience as a story (Pace-Schott,
2005). In dreaming, diminished capac-
ity for working memory, due to lateral
prefrontal inactivity, may prevent reflec-
tion upon immediately past events leading
to an unquestioned, forward progression
of the plot as well as frequent narrative
divergence. Interestingly, recent studies of
lucid dreaming have shown both return
of wake-like, gamma-frequency activity in
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the lateral PFC (Voss et al., 2009) and re-
activation of portions of posterior default
network along with lateral parietal, pre-
frontal, and occipito-temporal regions
(Dresler et al., 2012).
So what might this storytelling mod-
ule operating during dreams suggest to
individuals wholly unfamiliar with neuro-
science and scientific psychology? A keen
interest in dreams among some hunter-
gatherer societies is exemplified by the
practice of dream sharing (Wax, 2004).
Dreams are sometimes recounted as expe-
riences from another, parallel existence.
For example, The Amazonian Ese Eja
believe that, during dreaming, their spirit
inhabits a parallel world populated by
other spirits, including those of animals
(Peluso, 2004). Similarly, the Amazonian
Mehinaku believe each individual con-
tains several types of souls distinct from
their waking selves, one of which, the
“eye soul,” is active during the night expe-
riencing dreams but sleeps during the
day (Gregor, 1981). Similarly, among the
Andamanese Ongee society, discussion of
sensory details from multiple individu-
als’ dreams is used to build consensus
as to the probable locations of seasonal
food sources (Pandya, 2004). Therefore,
recalled dreams provide a ready source of
story-like narrative that can acquire cul-
tural significance equal to or exceeding the
retelling of waking events.
Basic human storytelling tendencies
are widely postulated (e.g., Schechtman,
1996; Nigam, 2012; Stafford, 2012). By
providing a template into which any expe-
rience, real or imaginary, can be inserted,
story-telling may be one way the brain
has evolved to efficiently represent and
record waking experience. Evolution may
have subsequently exploited this capacity
for multifold purposes including future
simulation. Hobson’s (2009) protocon-
sciousness theory, describes how dreams
adaptively support waking consciousness.
Similarly, evolution may have exploited
dreamed scenarios to rehearse survival
strategies (Revonsuo, 2000). In indige-
nous societies, story-like structure may
have facilitated integration of dream phe-
nomena such as parasomnias (e.g., sleep
paralysis, see Cheyne, 2003), lucidity, par-
tial awakenings and dream bizarreness into
existing belief systems, or even to create
newbeliefs and legends (seeNielsen, 1991).
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